The inconspicuous role of paraphrase

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In formal logic there is a premium on clever paraphrase, for it subsumes troublesome inferences under a familiar theory. (A paradigm is Davidson's analysis 1967 of inferences like ‘He buttered his toast with a knife; so, he buttered his toast’.) But the need for paraphrase in formal logic runs deeper than the odd recalcitrant inference, and thus, I shall argue, commits logicians to some interesting consequences. First, the thesis that arguments are valid in virtue of their form must be severely qualified (§4). And second, it is misleading to view a formal logical theory as a standard for justifying and criticizing inference (§7). The latter point depends on the nature and role of paraphrase, which permit a range of conflicting logical theories. Conflicting logical theories arise from the conflicting goals of logical theorists and the promiscuous nature of paraphrase makes reconciliation impossible.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)151-166
Number of pages16
JournalHistory and Philosophy of Logic
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1991

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Paraphrase
Logic
Inference
Formal Logic
Toast
Paradigm
Logicians
Theorists
Knife
Reconciliation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History
  • History and Philosophy of Science

Cite this

The inconspicuous role of paraphrase. / Sherry, David M.

In: History and Philosophy of Logic, Vol. 12, No. 2, 01.01.1991, p. 151-166.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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