The historical assessment of speech acts: Clarifications of Austin and Skinner for the study of religions

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6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This essay examines Quentin Skinner's historicist use of J. L. Austin's speech act theory, corrects and clarifies some ways in which Skinner seems to misapply Austin's categories, and argues that Skinner's approach, when refined by these few adjustments, is a viable program for the historical study of religious literature. What must be left behind in refining Skinner's project is the latter's apparent interest in an author's intentions, which is a datum absent from historical evidence. It is argued that speech acts have their effect only by means of public construal and response, and that history is an account of these construals, regardless of whether these correspond to what agents subjectively intended. The use of intentional descriptions of speech and action turns out to be a mere historiographic trope, with heuristic, but not explanatory value.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)84-113
Number of pages30
JournalMethod and Theory in the Study of Religion
Volume14
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2002

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Speech Acts
Construal
History
Intentions
Speech Act Theory
Tropes
Historical Evidence
Heuristics
Quentin Skinner
Religious Literature
J. L. Austin

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Religious studies

Cite this

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