Congressional influence on U.S. monetary policy

A reconsideration of the evidence

Marc C Chopin, C. Steven Cole, Michael A. Ellis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

One of the few works that finds strong evidence of congressional influence on U.S. monetary policy is Grier (1991), which finds a direct relationship between the liberalism of the Senate oversight committee leadership and monetary base growth. We extend this analysis by considering a longer sample period and by considering the preferences of House oversight committee leaders, in addition to Senators. Grier's evidence is not robust to these extensions. Where we do find correlation between congressional preferences and monetary base growth, increased liberalism of congressional oversight committees is associated with lower monetary base growth.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)561-570
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Monetary Economics
Volume38
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1996
Externally publishedYes

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Oversight
Monetary base
Monetary policy
Liberalism

Keywords

  • Congressional influence
  • Monetary policy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Congressional influence on U.S. monetary policy : A reconsideration of the evidence. / Chopin, Marc C; Cole, C. Steven; Ellis, Michael A.

In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 38, No. 3, 12.1996, p. 561-570.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Chopin, Marc C ; Cole, C. Steven ; Ellis, Michael A. / Congressional influence on U.S. monetary policy : A reconsideration of the evidence. In: Journal of Monetary Economics. 1996 ; Vol. 38, No. 3. pp. 561-570.
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